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Course Correction: Young v. United Parcel Service Makes Courts
Focus on Right Issues, but Also Reveals Limits of PDA
16 FEB 2016 | AND JOANNA L. GROSSMAN

POSTED IN: CIVIL RIGHTS

Last April, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Peggy Young, a UPS
driver who claimed she was the victim of unlawful pregnancy
discrimination when she was denied a routine workplace
accommodation that was made available to many other workers with
similar limitations. The Court ruled in her favor, vacating the grant of
summary judgment to United Parcel Service (UPS) and remanding for a
new trial on whether the benefits to the employer outweighed the
burden on the employees.
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On remand, Peggy Young’s case was settled; UPS agreed to pay damages
in an undisclosed amount. She deserves whatever she got (and probably
more). But she is not the only beneficiary of this ruling. It provides a
muchneeded course correction to stop federal and state courts from
dismissing pregnancy discrimination after a superficial review of the
complaint and a misapplication of the law. Some recent opinions, which
will be discussed in this column, make this effect evident.
But postYoung opinions also show the limitations of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act (PDA), the law under which she sued. At its best, it
offers only a comparative right of accommodation, which means
employers are free to deny even minor and costless accommodations as
long as they haven’t provided them to other employees. This is not a
problem that Young could have fixed because the problem is inherent in
the scope of the underlying statute. A recent case makes apparent why
that statute is too narrow to provide meaningful protection for pregnant
workers—and why the law should be amended to expand that
protection.

Young v. UPS: The Ruling and the
Problem It Fixed
When Peggy Young finally became pregnant after a series of
miscarriages, her doctor imposed a restriction on how much she could
lift. Young was an “air driver” for UPS, meaning she delivered packages
that arrived by plane rather than truck and, thus, were smaller and
lighter. She was rarely required to lift anything heavy, but her written
job description gave a minimum weight that she had to be able to lift,
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and she was no longer allowed to lift that weight. She requested light
duty, an accommodation made available by UPS policy to three large
groups of employees. But because she did not fall into any of the three
groups, she was denied the accommodation and forced out of her job.
Young sued under the PDA, the heart of federal protection for pregnant
workers. The 1978 law protects against employment actions taken
because of “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” This
protects against the usual types of discrimination—actions reflecting
animosity, bias, hostility, paternalism, or stereotypes. But a second
clause in the PDA provides a unique type of protection, one that directs
employers to treat those temporarily disabled by pregnancy the same as
it treats employees who are temporarily disabled from other causes.
The Second Clause has been the course of recurring conflict among
courts, particularly as applied to lightduty cases, like Peggy Young’s.
Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling last spring, several courts had held
that an employer could lawfully offer light duty only to workers injured
on the job, as long as they did not adopt the policy for the purpose of
excluding pregnant workers from the accommodation. These rulings,
which were a patent misreading of the PDA, collapsed the first and
second clauses into a single question: did the employer act with animus
against pregnant women?
In the Young ruling (which is analyzed in greater detail here and here),
the Court restored the meaning of the second clause, by insisting that it
be given some meaning beyond the first clause. But it didn’t do so in a
straightforward way and, indeed, rejected the most straightforward
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reading of the statute. In the majority’s view, the statute, which calls for
pregnant workers to be treated the same as comparably restricted
workers, is ambiguous as to whether pregnant workers are entitled to
the accommodations provided to any worker, or only those provided to
all or nearly all workers.
The majority crafted a new approach to applying the Second Clause of
the PDA, which makes use of the socalled McDonnellDouglas test,
which is used to smoke out discriminatory intent by employers accused
of unlawful disparate treatment. Under that test, a plaintiff must first
make out a prima facie case, demonstrating that she was treated
differently from someone similarly situated but outside the protected
class. A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of pregnancy
discrimination simply by showing that “she belongs to the protected
class, that she sought accommodation, that the employer did not
accommodate her, and that the employer did accommodate others
‘similar in their ability or inability to work.’”
Upon establishment of the prima facie case, the burden of production
then shifts to the employer, who must articulate a legitimate, non
discriminatory reason for its differential treatment. But not just any
nondiscriminatory reason. The Court specified that the “reason
normally cannot consist simply of a claim that it is more expensive or
less convenient to add pregnant women to the category of those (‘similar
in their ability or inability to work’) whom the employer
accommodates.”
The plaintiff then has the opportunity to reach a jury by “providing
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sufficient evidence that the employer’s policies impose a significant
burden on pregnant workers, and that the employer’s ‘legitimate,
nondiscriminatory’ reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the
burden, but rather—when considered along with the burden imposed—
give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.”

Applying the Young Ruling
On its face, the Young ruling seemed equipped to deal with the worst
cases that had preceded it. Many of the cases in which courts upheld the
denial of accommodations to pregnant workers would not survive
scrutiny under the Young standard. But, as with all rulings in the
discrimination context, the true scope of Young will not be known until
enough lower courts have had the opportunity to apply it to different
sets of facts.
Ten months is far too soon to assess the ruling’s impact, but the early
signs are good. For example, in a recent case, McQuistion v. City of
Clinton, the Supreme Court of Iowa applied basic PDA principles, as
elucidated in Young, to vacate a grant of summary judgment to an
employer and remand the case for deeper consideration of the facts
related to the denial of an accommodation to a pregnant worker. (The
claim was brought under the Iowa Civil Rights Act, but the court first
decided that, at least on this point, Iowa law was consistent with the
PDA as interpreted in Young.)
Karen McQuistion was employed as an engineer for the City of Clinton’s
fire department. She requested lightduty assignments during her
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pregnancy due to medical restrictions, but was denied because the light
duty positions were available only to those injured on the job and
eligible for workers’ compensation benefits.
Although the employer denied McQuistion a benefit that was available
to other workers, the lower court granted summary judgment to the city.
The Iowa Supreme Court vacated that ruling and did just what the
Supreme Court in Young envisioned: it remanded the case for a careful
examination of the facts and circumstances. The City’s argument, “that
the employer need not accommodate disability caused by pregnancy
unless it falls within specifically defined categories singled out for
accommodation,” could not prevail under Young. The policy of
exclusion cannot be used to defend the policy of exclusion. The court
thus also rejected the City’s argument that the proper comparators for
McQuistion were only those workers who were also suffering from
disability incurred off the job. On remand, she is to be compared with all
temporarily disabled workers.
This opinion does not establish any new ground, but it does show that
Young is doing the work it was intended to do. That is shown in other
postYoung cases as well, such as Martin v. WinnDixie Louisiana, a
case in which a woman’s PDA claim was remanded for trial because of
disputed facts about the employer’s reasons for denying her an
accommodation and about whether two other employees were proper
comparators. Together, these cases show that Young is forcing courts to
slow down, to think carefully about the challenged policy in front of
them, to question employer motives for denying accommodations to
pregnant women, and to give pregnant workers the full benefit of the
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protections the law provides. This, alone, is a victory.

The Limits of Young: Still No Right to
Reasonable Accommodation
The fight in lightduty cases, culminating in the Young opinion, was
about something simple—giving the second clause of the PDA its due.
But even when interpreted correctly, the PDA’s scope is limited. It
provides, at best, the accommodations that are available to other
employees in the same workplace. That gives employers a lot of latitude
to deny accommodations, even ones that are minor and costless, simply
by denying them to everyone. Young did not—and could not—fix this
problem.
A recent case, SanchezEstrada v. Mapfre PRAICO, considered a
complicated pregnancy discrimination claim, with many different
issues. But one illustrates the limited scope of the PDA. The plaintiff,
among other complaints, stated that she had requested a maternityfit
uniform when she reached a certain point in her pregnancy. The
employer refused to purchase one because it had exhausted its uniform
budget for the year. It did allow her to wear regular clothing after she
outgrew her regular uniform, but would not provide the accommodation
she sought. A federal court in Puerto Rico held that the employer was
under no obligation to provide the accommodation she sought because
it had not provided a similar accommodation to anyone else. Now this
might not seem like a compelling case, particularly as she was provided
a different accommodation, but this same principle would apply in cases
in which the failure to accommodate could result in the employee’s
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having to resign or take unpaid leave.
The lack of an absolute right of accommodation necessitates legislative
action. Pregnant women should not have to rely on the whim or
generosity of employers to gain the accommodations they might need to
continue working, particularly when those accommodations can be
made with little or no effort by the employer.
Efforts have been made in the past couple of years to lobby for the
Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA), a bill introduced into the
House that promised to “eliminate discrimination and promote
women’s health and economic security by ensuring reasonable
workplace accommodations for workers whose ability to perform the
functions of a job are limited by pregnancy, childbirth, or a related
medical condition.” PWFA is modeled on the Americans with
Disabilities Act, which balances the employee’s need for an
accommodation against the burden on the employer.
If enacted, the PWFA would make it unlawful to:
Refuse to “make reasonable accommodations to the known
limitations related to the pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions of a job applicant or employee” without demonstrating
“undue hardship” to the employer;
Deny employment opportunities to a woman in order to avoid
making required accommodations;
Force a woman to accept an accommodation she does not want; and
Force a woman to take leave “under any leave law or policy . . . if
another reasonable accommodation can be provided” instead.
https://verdict.justia.com/2016/02/16/coursecorrection
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Conclusion
Young was an important ruling, breaking up a disturbing pattern in
which courts were refusing to give the PDA its intended scope. It set the
stage for courts to look more closely at denials of accommodation, and
the early evidence suggests that they are doing just that. But it didn’t,
and couldn’t, extend the scope of the PDA, which is the obvious next
step.
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